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Abstract 
Gilbert Ryle (1949) divided knowledge into “know that” and
“know how”, which is neatly appealing to many Design &
Technology educators, and like many writers on developing the
curriculum, Kahney (1993) made a distinction between
declarative knowledge: 
"verbal knowledge, that is, the kind you get from books,
instructions and being told what to do." 
and procedural knowledge:
“In order to achieve skilled performance you need to be
able to translate declarative knowledge into actions. A new
form of representation, known as procedural knowledge
must be established.” 
(p.91)
However, a curriculum that consists simply of information and
techniques not only fails to reflect the original intentions of the
members of the working party for the creation of the National
Curriculum for Design & Technology (1988) but also misses
the mark in terms of developing creative and inventive minds.
Evidence from cognitive archaeology (e.g. Renfrew, 1994) also
suggests that the symbiotic relationship between mind and
hand that typifies technological action and innovation was a
primary driver within human evolution. Thus designing
technology is one of the defining characteristics of our species.
Technology education, therefore, should not be seen simply
from an instrumentalist viewpoint as a preparation for the
world of work but as a preparation for full functionality in
human society.
The contention within this paper is that if we fill up our
curriculum with declarative and procedural knowledge, without
acknowledging and encouraging the unique response or the
innovative idea, then we will have designed a curriculum that,
however hard we try, we will never really succeed in “making it
work” for many of our most creative pupils.
Introduction
The background for this paper is my doctoral research into
young children’s use of drawing for designing, involving analysis
of some 500 drawings by about 400 children aged 4-9 years,
followed by a more intensive longitudinal study of 2 parallel
Year 2 classes (Focus Class and Comparison Class, 25 children
in each), which lasted approximately 15 months (average age
6.5 years at start). 
As Table 1 demonstrates, the Comparison Class began Year 2
saturated with my teaching style, whereas the Focus Class and
I were almost strangers. This was ideal, since I was exploring
the effectiveness of a specific way of explaining the purpose of
drawing for designing and it was vital to eliminate any effects
of my teaching style. This also eased the ethical issues
surrounding such comparisons. Claire, who taught the
Comparison Class, knew I was trying a new method and that I
was not, therefore, comparing my teaching skill with her
teaching skill. We had worked together for about 5 years and
her classes had been part of the first phase of my research
activities and I had discussed this with her freely. However, I
purposely told no one in school, including Claire, of the central
metaphor of the longitudinal programme (Fig.2) in order to
ensure there would be no contamination of the data, since it
was the effectiveness of this metaphor that I was testing. 
This paper builds on the underlying ideas emerging and
developing out of this research into young children’s design
capabilities, which have been documented in papers at both
Design and Technology Association and Centre for Research
into Primary Technology (CRIPT) conferences across the last
few years. Part of my on-going attempt to unpick the bigger
picture issues that underpin what it means to be a creative,
design-capable human has led to a tentative taxonomy of the
features of conceptual learning within technological action,
which underpins children’s learning within Design and
Technology. 
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Knowing and Doing
The questions began early in my personal research journey. In
2000, at the DATA Millennium Conference, I put forward my
take on Gilbert Ryle’s know how / know that dualism (Fig. 1,
from Hope, 2000).
Fig. 1 Strategy Knowledge (Hope, 2000)
Where does strategy knowledge come from? How do we know
which bits of our store of knowledge (whether know how or
know that) is relevant in any given situation, especially in
complex situations such as designing?  At the time, all I had for
evidence of this synthesis and extension of Ryle’s duality were
my observations of children’s approaches to designing and a
rather large pile of Flat Stanley puppets made by about 300
children aged between ages 5 and 9 years old.
My central contention was two-fold. Firstly, that for practical
activities, however much factual knowledge a child (or adult)
might have about a topic, this would not impact on their
approach to a practical design task unless they saw the
relevance of that knowledge to the task. Children as young as
5 years old could draw what they wanted to make but only by
age 8 years were they using their drawing as a basis for action.
Knowing the parameters of the task and knowing how to draw
their ideas was not enough. 
In parallel to my research, Egan (1999) identified that children
did not understand the function of the drawing in the design
process. In my study, some of the youngest children asked
“Why are we drawing this twice?” (i.e. once on the paper and
again on the card) Since they were working in pairs, some
solved the dilemma by one child decorating the drawing whilst
the other made the puppet.
Metaphor and Paracosm
A sort of epiphany in my research process happened in 2001,
when I saw design drawing as being a metaphor, to which
Richard Kimbell said “I’m sure you’re right. All you need to do
now is prove it.”
But how?
Is it a provable hypothesis?
It became a working hypothesis such that, if I could find a
metaphor that would explain design drawing to children so that
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In Year 1 In Year 2
Focus Class Not taught by me at all
Taught by new colleague with no
knowledge of my research
D&T taught by teaching assistants,
because class teacher had little
enthusiasm for practical activities
D&T taught by me 1 afternoon per week;
Assessment Activities conducted termly,
same content and format as Comparison
Class
Taught purpose of drawing for designing
using metaphor shown in Fig.1
Comparisson Class My class (full time teaching)
Taught by colleague who worked
previously with me in Year 1 who knew a
lot about my research interests and
activities.
D&T taught by me as part of overall
curriculum delivery; design drawings
collected as part of first stage of research
D&T taught by class teacher; Assessment
Activities conducted termly by me, same
content and format as Focus Class
Not taught purpose of drawing for
designing using metaphor shown in Fig.1
Table 1: Experience of D&T by classes participating in longitudinal study
a) the analogy exists
knowledge that
b) it can be expoited 
strategy knowledge
c) know how to knowledge how
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their capability to use drawing for designing showed some
measurable improvement, I would have achieved a successful
research outcome. The metaphor I found (extrapolated from
Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) was that design drawing is
simultaneously a Container for ideas and a Journey of ideas
across the page and off the page into the prototype and/or
product (Fig. 2, Hope, 2003b). This is the metaphor by which I
explained the purpose of drawing for designing to the Focus
Class and it worked, (Hope 2003a). However, despite this
success, I was acutely aware that I had neatly side-stepped the
central issue of whether or not design drawing was a metaphor
by finding a metaphor for design drawing that produced
success in a classroom.
Fig. 2 Container and Journey Metaphor of Design Drawing
(Hope, 2003b)
The term “metaphor” is more commonly applied in literature,
especially in poetry. Was it the right word for drawing? Strictly
speaking, I think design drawing is a metonym, not a metaphor.
However, most people are less familiar with that term (which
makes it less useful) and also because metonyms are further
from other usefully related terms such as analogy and
extrapolation. In the past twelve months I have come to
believe that design capability is second cousin to paracosm.
A paracosm is a complete, internally logical, fantasy world.
Some people create a complete world which they draw, invent
maps and devise communities with a history and on-going
adventure (Tolkein’s Middle Earth is probably the best publicly
known paracosm). But everyone fantasises and tells
themselves stories, it is just the degree of complexity that
varies. Computer simulations such as Second Life demonstrate
the ease with which ordinary people create alternative worlds.
This paracosmic capacity, I would contend, is fundamental to
design, creativity and invention. Designing requires the ability to
create paracosms, to think in a system or context that has its
own internal logic, that obeys the laws of the system as
perceived, observed or created. As such, design and paracosm
are parallel universes. The same cognitive capacities are
common to both and they lie, I believe, close to the
foundations of what it is to be human. 
Cognitive Archaeology
Paralleling the philosophy of Ryle, but with no reference to him
(probably quite unaware of his contribution to English-speaking
epistemology) the French cognitive archaeologist Pelegrin
(1991)  identified connaissance and savoire-faire as the two
main characteristics of stone knapping hominid’s cognitive
capabilities. Connaissance equates roughly to “knowledge with
understanding” in English; savoire-faire equals “know-how”.
Producing a stone chopping tool, say Pelegrin (1991), required
an inner mental model of the final shape, an understanding of
the properties of stone and the know-how with which to
combine the two. Handling examples of such tools from half a
million years ago inspires a sense of connectedness with the
tool-makers who created these beautiful tear-shaped
symmetrical artefacts. Yet these tool-makers were not homo
sapiens, nor even homo anything. The tools were created by
pre-homo primates. Know-that and know-how are not enough
to define humanity’s capabilities. Whatever it is to be human
does not reside there. 
The British archaeologist Steven Mithen (1996) claims that a
cognitive re-shuffle happened at the birth of homo sapiens.
Whereas other previous and contemporaneous homo species
(including the Neanderthals) were knowledgeable about their
environment, had well-developed social skills and tool-making
capacities, there were no real connections between their
separate spheres of thought. When that occurred (the Great
Leap Forward of about 40,000 years ago) then creativity
began, of which we have evidence in a sudden flowering of
tool types, including tools to make tools, decoration, statuary
and art. After which all other homo species became extinct.
This joined-up thinking of which homo sapiens (humans) are
capable, transforms know-that / know-how into the most
powerful thinking strategy on the planet. It enables us to
design technology. No other creature on earth does this. Other
creatures have technical fixes that enable them to survive
(birds have their nests, chimpanzees have termite fishing
sticks) but no other creature actively and purposefully designs
the technology that they use in the way that humans do.
The ability to see something “as if”, which Craft (1997) called
“possibility thinking” or Wittgenstein (1969) describes as
“seeing as”, is close to the heart of design capability. However,
paracosm goes one stage deeper. The ability to reason,
imagine and think within a complete created system, the
author’s skill, is also the designer’s skill. The ability to create
and understand the world as stories and metaphors (“Contes
et Metaphores” Fèvre, 2004) underpins the creation of the
design narrative, and is first cousin to the dialogue between the
inner and outer reality that Winnicott (1971) identified within
play.
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Like play, paracosms have internal logic. However crazy to
others the tale might seem, the idea of an island populated by
tiny people, on which a normal sized man is shipwrecked, falls
asleep and wakes to find himself tied down by hundreds of
tiny threads, has its own internal logic. The contradictions were
ironed out in Defoe’s head. In the same way, the laws of
relativity were visually modelled in Einstein’s; or the mechanics
of Babbage’s difference engine were worked out in dialogue
between hand and brain. Really powerful paracosms create
paradigm shifts and major technological breakthroughs.
Conceptual Foundations
The human cognitive design architecture is:
• Agentic
Subsumed under the term “agentic” are concepts such as
sentience, self-awareness and evaluative capabilities; the
relatives of meta-cognition. The ability to classify and reflect on
the success of one’s own and other peoples’ thoughts, ideas
and designs depends on the awareness of one’s self as a
subject, an agent who can plan, decide and effect changes in
the environment, whether physical, social or cognitive. 
Agency assumes “I can do”, empowerment and action. Atman
(1992) used the word “conation” to imply a similar concept.
“Enaction” is a similarly related term:
“… all technical artefacts, from stone tools to cars to
computers, are "enactive interfaces" that mediate the
structural coupling between human beings and the
world they live in, and hence bring forth a particular
world of lived experience”  
(Khatchatourov et al. 2008)
In Example 1, Carl, aged 7 years, has drawn a pencil alongside
his design idea. “That’s me drawing” he explained, in assertion
of agency and self-reference. 
Example 1: “That’s me drawing!”
Tomasello (1999) claimed that this leads to a theory of mind
that perceives others as showing intentionality of action such
that learning is possible both through imitation of techniques
and direct instruction. Furthermore, this enables humans to
take the perspective of another and design something that will
be useful for someone else, even if we have no need of the
artefact ourselves, which, in turn, enables us to evaluate
existing and possible solutions to design questions without
having to actually make the product. 
• Symbolic
Language, both spoken and written is uniquely human
symbolic reference system that enables us to think, imagine
and design.  “Man is a symbolic animal” (Fèvre, 2004) and this
enables us to make sense of the world through the creation of
narrative and to communicate our ideas to others.
For example, by Year 3 (aged 7-8 years) the Focus Class in my
research confidently used their drawings as discussion
documents. The parallel Comparison Class drew their design
ideas individually and without discussion. Not only were there
far more children whose products did not satisfy the design
brief but the range of ideas across the Comparison Class were
more limited. Discussion not only helped the Focus Class
children to remain centred on the design question, but also
enabled them to spark ideas off each other.
Drawings, the making of prototypes and other models that can
be examined and discussed as if they were the real thing also
serve a symbolic function. Example 2 not only shows 7-year
old Maria’s use of numerical standardised measuring units, but
also her ability to use a diagram that records just the relevant
part of the drawing for her purpose. She does not need to re-
draw the whole travel bag for the toy Panda, she simply draws
the two sides to remind herself of the dimensions.
Example 2: Maria’s use of symbolisim
• Systematic
During one lesson, Maria and I had conducted a conversation
at cross-purposes because I thought each sketch on her paper
represented a different idea. Later, I saw she had added the
arrows and I understood that she wanted me to know that she
had been using drawing to think through the process of
making the product (Example 3: Maria’s Easter Egg Holder).
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Example 3: Maria’s Easter Egg Holder
Human technological activity involves awareness of the
teleology of the design task and the systematic fore-thought
and planning of the processes and techniques needed to bring
it into being, including gathering together all the required
materials and, possibly, involving others in the plan. Integral to
this are both analysis and synthesis, the ability to mentally take
things apart and re-construct something new.
• Rational
Like paracosms, designs must make sense in order to work.
Our rational faculties enable us to see what will work and
what will not, whether by deduction or induction (of which
extrapolation is the extension which starts to border with
analogy and metaphor). We compare what we see to what
we know from past experience and can judge whether or not
the idea holds an internal logic. This faculty develops with age.
For instance, adults see the joke within Professor Brainstorm’s
inventions whereas small children just stare at them without
perceiving the illogical and impossible. The age at which
children’s humour develops to the point where they start to
tell linguistic jokes (about age 6-7) is also, interestingly, the
age at which they can begin to use drawing effectively for
designing. However much Piaget’s experimental technique has
been maligned for its validity (for example, Donaldson, 1979),
he did appear to have come to valid overall conclusions.
There is a shift in the way in which children of this age reason
about the world.
• Creative
Koestler (1974) began his book “The Act of Creation” with a
consideration of humour. In his view, the ability to see the mis-
match between two things as funny is fundamental to
creativity. His term “bisociation” includes analogy, metaphors,
trophes and other linguistic and poetic devices, as well as
design. 
Paralleling Lakoff and Johnson (1980 “Metaphors We Live By”),
Fèvres (2004 “Contes et Metaphores” (Stories and Metaphors)
claims that all knowledge is built through narrative. Bruner
(1962) distinguished between paradigmatic (mathematical and
scientific) ways of thinking and narrative ways, and believed
that there was no possible dialogue between the two.
However, I would now contend both conclusions. I think that
true creativity comes through the bisociation of the rational and
the divergent. It is the application of reason to possibility that
turns divergency into creativity, the crazy idea into a plausible
design. 
Some children in the research caused me so much angst over
whether a solution is creative if it is beyond the constraints of
the design brief (Hope, 2004, 2007). My current thinking is
that a successful design solution must also follow from the
rational as well as the narrative. One girl, Shannon,  was so
good at narrative that she even constructed “Episode 2” for
one of my design tasks (Hope, 2004). Although this solution
followed logically from the parameters of the design question,
it did so only as narrative. It was not, therefore, a creative
design solution to the question she was asked to address.
Leaps of the imagination are fine, as long as they land
somewhere within the zone of possible answers (Middleton’s
(2000) “satisficing zone”). Playing with ideas only moves from
being a paracosm to being a design solution if the answer
conforms to the internal logic of the design question.
The “So What?” Factor
How does all this relate to our teaching and to research into
children’s learning in Design & Technology?
Firstly, the teaching of techniques is not enough. The National
Curriculum for Design & Technology for England & Wales
(1999) defines its Breadth of Study as covering three areas:
• Investigating familiar products
• Focused practical tasks
• Design and make assignments
However, too often in schools, children seem to be doing a
series of focused practical tasks in which they learn a series of
techniques rather than being given a design and make
assignment in which they can make real choices and
experience real freedom in design. 
What I have tried to do in this paper is to begin to unpick what
going beyond “how to make it work” might look like. My research
demonstrated that simply teaching children techniques of
drawing is not enough (Hope, 2003a). They need to understand
the purpose of the activity for deep learning and application to
take place. It seems to me that, if homo neandertahlensis had
know-that and know-how, and passed these on from generation
to generation and yet went extinct, we need to do something a bit
better for young homo sapiens in the interests of the future of our
species. This paper is another step along my journey of
exploration into what that might be and why.
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